The author, who died in 1937, brought to the writing of this history of philosophy the talents of a great historian and of a great philosophical critic. He deploys a vast array of facts in a lively and memorable manner and conveys a vivid impression of the principal characters; he also grasps the nature of the problems'they were trying to solve and the strengths and weaknesses of the solutions proposed. However, the book is so well known and so generally admired that it would be superfluous to describe or to praise it further. If there is any part of it which disappoints on re-reading, it is the estimate of the younger Mill. Halevy evidently felt that John Stuart Mill lacked the disciplined mind and clarity of the early Radicals; and that the qualifications which he tried to make in Utilitarianism, only served to re-introduce "that sentimentalism which the orthodox Benthamites had denned only in order to condemn." This is a hard saying. No doubt his ethical writings are full of confusions and hesitations. But this is partly because he sees so many sides to questions that had once looked simple; and has moral misgivings over the possible inward consequences of the pure Benthamite doctrine. His mind is both sensitive and suggestive and what he wrote still seems alive.
However, Halevy treats of J. S. Mill only incidentally. The Philosophical Radical movement began to break up even before the death of James Mill; and his son's attempt to broaden it into "a Utilitarianism of the whole of human nature" was altogether unsuccessful. In his diary of 1854, John Mill recorded the fact that complete oblivion had overcome the name of James Mill. But if the movement came to an end, the temper and point of view of the Benthamites continued to influence ever-widening circles. And for this, the writings of J. S. Mill were very largely responsible. Haldvy had something more to say of this later phase in the posthumous volume of his history, in Thinking? As can be seen at once, this is a vast undertaking. It is supplemented by an introduction, by bibliographical notes both in the introduction and in an appendix, and finally by an index.
When we are given so much, it would be absurd to complain that we are not given more; but it is to be hoped that Professor Beck or someone else may one day give us the second volume which is still necessary if English readers are to appreciate Kant's moral philosophy on its more human side, and particularly in its application to the political and moral problems of ordinary life. This comes out in the shorter and semi-popular articles of which Professor Beck has given us a sample; for a fuller understanding we require also the various essays on history, and especially the discussion on the relation of theory to practice. Above all there is needed a readable version of the Metaphysic of Morals itself, to which Professor Beck, like many others, seems to assign less importance than it deserves.
The translation of Abbott, in spite of its considerable merits, not only suffers from occasional obscurities and indeed errors, but is written throughout in an idiom no longer in common use. Professor Beck has thus rendered a valuable service even where the two translations coincide. His version is readable and scholarly throughout, and one cannot but be grateful for the zeal and industry which has sustained him in so protracted and difficult a task. No translation can be a substitute for a study of the language used by Kant himself, but those who read German only imperfectly can use Professor Beck's work in the assurance that they have in him a reliable guide.
It is a little more difficult to speak on questions of style. Kant's own style is admittedly not easy, but this is mainly because he is like a juggler who keeps so many balls moving through the air that it is hard to see precisely what is happening. Some translations, on the other hand, give the impression that he was a fumbler, unable to say what he meant without awkwardness. Professor Beck does not always succeed in avoiding this-perhaps in a work of such an extent it is unreasonable to expect that he should. Take, for example, such sentences as the following, from the early part of the Groundwork. "I immediately see that I could will the lie but not a universal law to lie." "Innocence is indeed a glorious thing, but, on the other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself, being easily led astray." "The word 'prudence' may be taken in two senses, and it may bear the name of prudence with reference to things of the world and private prudence." Sentences like these are neither inaccurate nor unintelligible, but they are unnecessarily clumsy. Abbott often shows a similar clumsiness, but in this respect he should be taken as a warning, not as a model. And why should he be followed-to mention one very small point-in imputing to Kant the extraordinary belief that a jewel can "sparkle with its own light" ? Professor Beck's bibliographical notes and his short introduction are admirable for their purpose. A fair attempt is made to trace Kant's ethical development and the relation of his ethics to the rest of his philosophy. It would be unreasonable to expect more. Some of the details, on the other hand, are open to question. Thus the complaint that Kant fails in his mature philosophy to consider "the empirical variety of the moral phenomenon" seems to me to spring from an unjustified neglect of the Metaphysic of Morals.
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As a matter of exposition, a synthetic proposition for Kant is not one which goes "beyond the subject"-if it did so, it would be false-but one which goes beyond the subject-concept. Nor does it seem to me true to say that "before Kant," a priori synthetic judgment "would have been considered a contradictio in adjecto." If we set aside the verbal objection that this terminology was unknown before Kant himself, what is said may perhaps be true of Hume; but of other philosophers it would be more correct to say that they were continually making synthetic a priori judgments without being aware of what they were doing or of the need for justifying their procedure.
The cost of this book may be a serious obstacle to English students-I gather that at one time it was priced at 27s. 6d., but that the price has subsequently been raised, presumably because of devaluation. I can only say that those who fail to consult it will suffer a serious loss. Whatever its price, it ought to be in every university and college library.
H. J. PATON.
The Proper Study of Mankind. By STUART CHASE. (London: Phoenix House. 1950. Pp. 288 . Price 16s. net.) Like Mr. Chase's previous writings, this book is very much a tract for the times; and as such it is addressed to the general reader rather than to the student of philosophy. But the student of philosophy cannot be indifferent to its message, which is that the only possible cure for the troubles of the world is to be found in the serious development and application of the social sciences; and he will find much to interest him in the way in which this message is imparted. Even if it does not strike him as particularly new, he will welcome the obvious seriousness and sincerity with which it is argued and the lively and readable accounts of some recent achievements of the social sciences in the U.S.A., especially in wartime, with which it is supported and illustrated. And he will have no doubt whatever that Mr. Chase's heart is very much in the right place.
At the same time he is likely to feel that seriousness and sincerity and readability, not to mention having one's heart in the right place and the numerous other good qualities which the book undoubtedly possesses, are not enough. And this feeling is likely to arise with special intensity in connection with the treatment (or lack of treatment) of the questions which are usually taken to be his special province. For example, the account of scientific method, even if not actually misleading, is entirely on a popular level. And there is no serious attempt to consider how the social sciences differ from the natural sciences, either in their methods or in the ways in which they can be used as instruments of power by the individuals or groups which practice or control them. Even from the point of view of the general reader, these are surely serious drawbacks. It may be unfair to compare the book, as a reviewer in another place" has compared it, to a science article in the Reader's Digest; but it certainly gives the impression that the social sciences are much easier to understand, and to put into practice, than they are ever likely to be.
O. DE SELINCOURT.
Gottlob Frege: The Foundations of Arithmetic (Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik).
Translation by J. L. Austin. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1950. Pp. 132 (xii + 119) . Price 16s.) The name of Frege has become one of the most honoured in the history of mathematics. But the history of mathematics contains not a few tragedies. Frege's story is doubly tragic: not only did his work gain no adequate
